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Abstract
Motivated by emerging resource allocation and data placement problems such as web caches and peer-to-
peer systems, we consider and study a class of resource allocation problems over a network of agents (nodes).
In this model, nodes can store only a limited number of resources while accessing the remaining ones through
their closest neighbors. We consider this problem under both optimization and game-theoretic frameworks. In
the case of optimal resource allocation we will first show that when there are only k = 2 resources, the optimal
allocation can be found efficiently in O(n2 log n) steps, where n denotes the total number of nodes. However,
for k ≥ 3 this problem becomes NP-hard with no polynomial time approximation algorithm with a performance
guarantee better than 1+ 1102k2 , even under metric access costs. We then provide a 3-approximation algorithm for
the optimal resource allocation which runs only in linear time O(n). Subsequently, we look at this problem under
a selfish setting formulated as a noncooperative game and provide a 3-approximation algorithm for obtaining
its pure Nash equilibria under metric access costs. We then establish an equivalence between the set of pure
Nash equilibria and flip-optimal solutions of the Max-k-Cut problem over a specific weighted complete graph.
Using this reduction, we show that finding the lexicographically smallest Nash equilibrium for k ≥ 3 is NP-hard,
and provide an algorithm to find it in O(n32n) steps. While the reduction to weighted Max-k-Cut suggests that
finding a pure Nash equilibrium using best response dynamics might be PLS-hard, it allows us to use tools from
quadratic programming to devise more systematic algorithms towards obtaining Nash equilibrium points.
Index Terms
Network resource allocation; computational complexity; approximation algorithm; pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium; Max-k-Cut; quadratic programming, game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Resource allocation problems have always been challenging and widely studied by many researchers
from multiple disciplines. Broadly speaking, in most of the resource allocation problems the goal is
to allocate a limited number of resources to a set of agents in order to optimize a specific objective
function such as the overall access cost, network reliability, or resource availability. More particularly,
depending on what constraints are to be satisfied at an optimal allocation, one may expect to see a
wide range of results both in terms of computational complexity and solution structure. For instance,
the solution structure can completely change if the entire allocation system is operated by a central
authority or by the individual agents themselves.
In this regard, perhaps facility location problems are one of the most classic resource allocation
problems which were extensively studied in the past literature [1]–[6]. In simple words, an instance of
the facility location problem is identified by a set of clients and a set of potential facilities. Opening
each facility has a certain fixed cost and clients may incur different costs when accessing different
facilities. The goal is to open a subset of facilities and assign each client to an open facility in order to
minimize the total facility opening costs and clients’ access costs. In particular, depending on whether
or not the facilities can serve a limited number of clients one can distinguish between capacitated [7]
or uncapacitated [4] alternatives.
In fact, one can view facility location problem as a special case of a single resource allocation problem
by viewing open facilities as copies of a single resource which are distributed in different locations to
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satisfy clients’ demands at minimum cost. However, often each facility can provide only one type of
service while a client may need multiple service types (i.e., it must obtain access to different facilities).
This can be viewed as multi-resource allocation problem (one resource for each facility type) where
the goal is to minimize the access cost of all of the nodes to all of the resources. We refer to [3],
[5], [6], [8]–[10] for several variants of multi-type facility location problems with the main focus being
on approximating the optimal allocations. In addition, in some facility location problems the set of
potential facilities and clients are determined a priori, meaning that if an agent is determined as a client,
it cannot serve as a facility or vice versa. On the other hand, motivated by the real emerging distributed
system such as web-caches or ad-hoc video streaming networks where a user/agent/node can act both
as a facility or a client, a major question is what type of resources each node must provide so that the
resource accessibility cost over the entire network is minimized.
The resource allocation problem we consider in this paper can be viewed as a multi-type facility
location problem in which nodes can simultaneously provide and request for a service (resource). More
specifically, we consider a network of agents where each agent has limited cache size and can store
only a small number of resources. However, each agent must obtain access to all of the resources. If a
resource is available in an agent’s cache, it incurs no extra cost for that specific resource. Otherwise,
it incurs a cost for obtaining each missing resource from the closest neighbor who has that resource.
We consider this problem from two different perspectives, namely optimal allocation and selfish (game)
allocation. In the optimal allocation setting we are interested to know how to assign resources to the
agents in a centralized manner so as to minimize the overall access costs. In the game-theoretic setting
we want to determine whether the entire system converges to any stable equilibrium provided that each
agent selfishly caches its favorite resources, and we attempt to compute one such equilibrium point.
As an application of optimal allocation setting one can consider a data placement problem over a
network of servers (service providers). Each node can be viewed as a server which can only store a
limited amount of data in its cache. The communication network between service providers determines
the access costs where the farther the servers are located from each other, the more delay costs they
incur in obtain access to each other. When a client refers to a server and requests for data, if that server
has the requested data in its cache, it can immediately provide that data to its client without any time
delay. Otherwise, the requested data must be accessed through communication with the closest server
possessing that data, which incurs some delay cost. Therefore, the central authority who operates the
entire data center aims to minimize the overall delay costs by appropriately assigning data to different
servers, taking into account the communication costs among them. Now under game-theoretic setting,
one can address exactly the same question when the servers act selfishly and individually. Perhaps in
this case one can consider a peer-to-peer data sharing system (e.g., movie sharing service) where the
nodes are individuals who only care about minimizing their own delay costs by storing appropriate data
(movies) and accessing the remaining ones through others.
A. Literature Review
Facility location problems have been extensively studied in both engineering and computer science
literature [1], [2], [4]–[6]. It is well-known that the facility location problem even in its simplest form
i.e., uncapacitated with metric access costs is NP-hard [1]. Therefore, a huge effort in the past few
decades has been devoted to devising fast heuristic algorithms to deliver good sub-optimal solutions.
For instance, the sequence of works in [2], [4], [6] provide different approximation algorithms to improve
the best known approximation factors. In fact, it has been shown that for the metric facility location
problem finding a polynomial time algorithm with an approximation guarantee better than 1.463 is
NP-hard [11]. Given that our goal here is not to provide an exhaustive review of the past literature
on the facility location problem (and its different variants such as the p-median problem [4]), we refer
interested readers to [8] and [12] for comprehensive surveys.
The resource allocation problem under the optimization setting that we consider in this paper was first
introduced in [13] where the authors provided a 20.5-approximation algorithm for the optimal resource
placement with general heterogeneous request rates (i.e., when different items have different request
rates). In a subsequent work by the same authors [14] this approximation ratio has been further improved
to 10. The main approach in both of these works were based on the clustering technique of [15] adopted
for the linear programming (LP) relaxation of the optimal allocation problem and then rounding the
solution using a network flow problem. In particular, it was left open in [13] the question of whether
there exists a simple local search or greedy algorithm for obtaining the optimal allocation with a good
performance guarantee. In this work we answer this question by providing a greedy algorithm which
substantially improves the earlier approximation factors to 3 under homogeneous settings (i.e., when
resources have identical installation costs and request rates). It is worth noting that, if we consider a
more restricted version of this problem in which agents can satisfy at most a limited number of their
resource requests, then the optimal solution cannot be approximated within a constant factor unless the
cache capacities are violated by a constant factor [16].
On the other hand, resource allocation problems have been extensively studied from a game-theoretic
perspective [17]–[21]. Typically, resource allocation games are identified by a set of available resources
for each player, where the players are allowed to access each other through a communication network.
Such a communication network determines the access cost among the players, and the goal for each
player is to satisfy his/her customers’ needs at minimum cost. In fact, it has been observed in practice that
resource allocation games often provide good resource distribution in terms of availability and reliability
for the users [22], [23]. Resource allocation games arise in a wide variety of contexts such as congestion
games [24]–[26], load balancing [27], peer-to-peer systems [28], web-caches [18], content management
[28], and market sharing games [29]. Distributed replication games with servers that have access to
all of the resources and are accessible at some cost by users have been studied in [30]. Moreover, the
uncapacitated selfish resource allocation game where the agents have access to the set of all of the
resources with no constraint on their cache size was studied in [22]. However, the resource allocation
game that we consider in this paper is more complicated than the one in [22], as the constraints on
cache sizes couples the strategic actions of the players in a much more complex form.
Another class of resource allocation games which are closely related to our work are graph coloring
games [31], [32]. In graph coloring games the nodes of an undirected/directed graph are the players,
the strategy set of each node consists of the k colors, and the payoff of a node v in a given state or
coloring is given by the number of outgoing neighbors with a color different from the one of v. It
has been shown in [31] that coloring games on undirected graphs admit an exact potential games (and
hence a pure Nash equilibrium), which can be found in polynomial time. However, this is quite different
from our setting in which only the existence of a much weaker potential function, namely an ordinal
potential function is known, while the complexity of finding a pure Nash equilibrium is still open.
In this paper we consider a class of resource allocation games which were first introduced and studied
in [18] under ultra-metric access costs. In particular, it was shown that such games always admit a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) which can be found in polynomial time when there are only k = 2
resources. However, for k ≥ 3 resources, it was conjectured in [18] that finding a NE in general is
PLS-hard. In this work we substantially expand upon their results by taking the first step toward settling
this conjecture. This is done by establishing an equivalence between the set of NE points and the set of
flip-optimal solutions of the Max-k-Cut problem with specific weight structure. As finding a flip-optimal
solution to the Max-k-Cut problem with arbitrary weights is known to be PLS-hard [33], this suggests
that adopting similar reduction techniques as in [33] to our specific weight structure, one might be able
to establish PLS-hardness of finding a NE in the resource allocation game.
B. Organization and Contributions
In Section II we first introduce the problem of optimal resource allocation, provide some of its salient
properties, and discuss its similarities to facility location problems. We then study the computational
complexity of finding an optimal allocation in Section III where we show that this problem for the
case of k = 2 can be solved efficiently without any assumption regarding the access costs. However,
for k ≥ 3 we show that it does not even admit a polynomial time approximation algorithm within a
factor better than 1 + 1
102k2
(unless P=NP). In particular, we show that finding an optimal allocation
with heterogeneous request rates is NP-hard even when there are only k = 2 resources. In Section
IV we provide a greedy linear time 3-approximation algorithm for the optimal allocation assuming
metric access costs and homogeneous request rates. In Section V we turn our attention to the resource
allocation problem under the game-theoretic setting and show that the aforementioned greedy algorithm
also delivers a 3-approximate NE under metric access costs. We then provide some complexity results
regarding computing NE points and establish a connection between NE points and flip-optimal solutions
of the weighted Max-k-Cut problem. Leverage our reduction to the weighted Max-k-Cut, in Section VI
we provide two new algorithms based on quadratic programming to compute NE points more efficiently.
We conclude the paper by identifying several future directions of research in Section VII.
Notations: Throughout the paper we adopt the following notations: For a positive integer n, we let
[n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. We use G = (V,E) for an undirected graph with node set V and edge set E. We
use |S| to denote the cardinality of a finite set S. Given a matrix A, we denote its transpose by AT ,
its ith row by Ai, and its ijth entry by [A]ij . We sometimes refer to entries of a matrix by lower case
characters, i.e., [A]ij = aij . We denote the Frobenius norm of A by ‖A‖, and its trace by tr(A). A
nonnegative matrix A is called stochastic if it has row sum 1 for every row. Given a vector v we denote
all of its entries except the ith one by v−i. Finally, we use 〈, 〉 for the inner product of two vectors, and
ei to denote the ith basic unit vector in Rk.
II. OPTIMAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Let us consider a set of [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} nodes and a set of k distinct resources O = {o1, o2, . . . , ok}.
The access cost between every pair of nodes i, j ∈ [n] is given by a nonnegative real number cij . In
this section we assume that the access costs satisfy metric property, i.e.,
• cii = 0,∀i ∈ [n],
• cij = cji, ∀i, j,
• triangle inequality: cij + cjr ≥ cir,∀i, j, r ∈ [n].
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each node can hold only one resource in its cache. However,
all the results can be extended to instances where nodes can hold u ∈ Z+ different resources in their
cache (see Proposition 1 below). As a result we can represent a feasible resource allocation profile by
P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn), where Pi ∈ O represents the resource held by node i.1 Given an allocation profile
P , the access cost for node i is given by:
Ci(P ) :=
∑
`∈O
ci,i(`), (1)
where i(`) denotes agent i’s nearest node holding resource ` in the allocation profile P , i.e, i(`) =
arg minj{cij : Pj = `}. If there does not exists such i(`), we simply define the cost of getting access to
resource ` by node i to be very large (e.g., ∞) so that every resource is assigned to at least one node.
Also, note that without loss of generality we may assume that each node holds a resource in its cache
1Throughout this paper we interchangeably use the terms caching/allocating/assigning a resource to a node.
Fig. 1. An instance of a feasible resource allocation P with n = 11 nodes and k = 3 resources. Different resources O = {o1, o2, o3}
are denoted by different colors. Here, the access costs are determined by the graphical distances so that C1(P ) = 0 + 1 + 1 = 2, and
C8(P ) = 0 + 1 + 2 = 3.
since the model does not assume any resource storage cost. Finally, the goal is to find an allocation
profile P which minimizes the total sum of the access costs over all the nodes, i.e.,
min
P∈Ok
n∑
i=1
Ci(P ) (2)
where Ok denotes the Cartesian product of O by itself, k times. An instance of a feasible resource
allocation for n = 11 nodes and k = 3 resources is illustrated in Figure 1. Here we are simply
assuming that the access costs are induced by graphical distances and the cost of traversing an edge
equals to 1. For instance, node 8 incurs zero cost to access resource o1 (since this resource is available
in its cache) and incurs 1 and 2 units of costs to access resources o2 and o3, respectively. Finally we
note that if n ≤ k, all the nodes will allocate different resources and the problem becomes trivial. Hence
we can simply assume n > k.
Proposition 1: Every instance of an optimal resource allocation with cache size u can be converted
into a unit cache size instance where each node can only hold one resource.
Proof: Consider an optimal allocation instance P with access costs cij, i, j ∈ [n], where each
node has capacity u ∈ Z+. This means that each node can store up to u resources with zero cost and
access the remaining k− u resources through its closest neighbors. Consider a unit cache size instance
by replacing each node i by u of its unit capacity copies i1, . . . , iu. We set the access cost between
different copies of a node to be zero, i.e., ciris = 0,∀r, s ∈ [u], and the access cost between each copy of
nodes i 6= j to be 1
u
times of that between nodes i and j, i.e., cirjs =
1
u
cij . By this construction, clearly
the new costs still satisfy the metric property. Moreover, different copies of a node i must allocate
different resources in an optimal allocation of the new instance. In particular, by the symmetry, all of
the different copies of a node i in the new instance incur the same cost and are equal to 1
u
Ci(P ). Thus
the total cost of the new instance is exactly equal to
n∑
i=1
u∑
r=1
Cir =
n∑
i=1
u× 1
u
Ci(P ) =
n∑
i=1
Ci(P ).
This shows that instead of analyzing an instance of the optimal resource allocation with n nodes and
cache size u, we can simply analyze its unit cache size counterpart with nu nodes. In particular, by
putting together the cache contents of nodes i1, i2, . . . , iu, one can obtain the cache content of node i
for the original instance.
As a consequence of Proposition 1, in the remainder of this paper we only consider the optimal
resource allocation problem when nodes have unit cache size.
A. Resource Allocation versus p-Median Problem
Before we get into analysis of optimal allocation, in the following we discuss some of the similarities
and differences between the optimal resource allocation problem given in (2) and a variant of the
uncapacitated facility location problem known as p-median problem [4].
Given a set of potential facilities N and a set of clients M , in the p-median problem one aims to
open a subset Q ⊆ N of at most p facilities such that the total facility access cost over all of the clients
is minimized. This optimization problem can be written as
min
Q⊂N :|Q|≤p
∑
i∈M
min
j∈Q
cij, (3)
where cij denotes the cost of getting access to facility i by client j. Now let us reformulate our resource
allocation problem given in (2) as an optimization problem of the form (3). For this purpose, let
V ` 6= ∅, ` ∈ [k], denote the set of nodes which allocate resource `, and define V to be the set of all
nonempty k-partitions of the set [n], i.e.,
V := {(V 1, . . . , V k) : ∪k`=1V ` = [n], V ` ∩ V `
′
= ∅,∀` 6= `′}.
Then the total cost of resource allocation (V 1, . . . , V k) ∈ V is given by
n∑
i=1
(
min
j∈V 1
cij + . . .+ min
j∈V k
cij
)
.
Therefore, finding the optimal resource allocation in (2) is equivalent to solving the following optimiza-
tion problem:
min
(V 1,...,V k)∈V
∑
i∈M
(
min
j∈V 1
cij + . . .+ min
j∈V k
cij
)
. (4)
Comparing (4) and (3), one can see a close relationship between the p-median problem and the optimal
resource allocation problem. In fact, the resource allocation problem can be viewed as a multi-type p-
median problem where instead of optimizing over only one set Q, we are optimizing over multiple sets
(V 1, . . . , V k). This makes the analysis much more complicated as now we have to deal with different
types of resources (facilities) which are highly coupled. In other words, we cannot view the resource
allocation problem as k separate p-median problems in isolation. This is because assigning a resource `
to a node i (opening a facility to provide service `) completely changes the supply for other resources
(the need for opening other types of facilities). Moreover, in the optimal resource allocation problem
the set of nodes which can allocate resource ` is itself subject to a design. While these extra design
features complicates the analysis of the optimal resource allocation, from the computational complexity
perspective it relaxes some of the hard constraint in the p-median problem (such as opening only p
facilities).
It is worth noting that the optimal resource allocation problem (2) (or equivalently (4)) can also be
cast as an integer linear program. For this purpose, let us define x`ij = 1 if node j requests resource `
from node i, and x`ij = 0, otherwise. Moreover, let y
`
i = 1 if node i allocates resource `, and y
`
i = 0,
otherwise. Now the set of all feasible resource assignments is given by the following constraints:
• x`ij ≤ y`i , ∀i, j ∈ [n], ` ∈ [k], i.e., node j can only request resource ` from node i, if node i has
this resource in its cache.
•
∑k
`=1 y
`
i = 1, ∀i ∈ [n], i.e., each node has to allocate exactly one resource.
•
∑n
i=1 x
`
ij = 1, ∀` ∈ [k], j ∈ [n], i.e., each node j receives resource ` from some node i.
Therefore, the optimal resource allocation can be formulated as:
min
n∑
i,j=1
k∑
`=1
cijx
`
ij
x`ij ≤ y`i , ∀i, j ∈ [n], ` ∈ [k]
k∑
`=1
y`i = 1, ∀i ∈ [n]
n∑
i=1
x`ij = 1, ∀` ∈ [k], j ∈ [n]
x`ij, y
`
i ∈ {0, 1}.
In what follows next we focus on the optimal resource allocation problem as a k-level extension of the
p-median problem and study complexity and approximability of its optimal solutions.
III. COMPLEXITY AND APPROXIMABILITY OF THE OPTIMAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION
In this section we first consider the optimal resource allocation with only k = 2 resources, and then
study the complexity of computing an optimal allocation for k ≥ 3 resources. In the following theorem
we show that when the number of resources is k = 2, then a simple algorithm can find an optimal
allocation in no more than O(n2 log n) steps.
Theorem 2: The optimal resource allocation with k = 2 resources can be found in O(n2 log n) steps,
where n is the total number of nodes.
Proof: Let us view the nodes in the resource allocation problem as nodes of a weighted complete
graph where the weight of edge {i, j} is given by the access cost cij . We sort the edges of this complete
graph in a nondecreasing weight order. This can be done in O(n2 log n) which is the dominant stage
in our algorithm. At iteration t = 1, 2, . . ., we select the lowest weight edge which spans at least one
more node (i.e., at least one of its end points has not been assigned a resource yet). If none of the end
points of the selected edge are assigned a resource, we arbitrarily assign resource 1 to one of them and
resource 2 to the other one. But if one of its end points was already assigned a resource, we assign to
the other end point an opposite resource. Following this process, a simple induction shows that the cost
of an arbitrary node i at the termination is given by Ci = minj 6=i cij , which is the best possible that
can be achieved by node i. Thus the allocation profile obtained at the termination will be an optimal
allocation.
It is worth noting that the proof of Theorem 2 does not use the metric property of the costs and
works under general symmetric access costs. Unfortunately, if we increase the number of resources
from k = 2 to k = 3, the problem becomes much more complicated. This has been shown formally in
the following theorem.
Theorem 3: It is NP-hard to find an optimal allocation with k ≥ 3 resources, even under metric
access costs.
Proof: The proof is by reduction from the Max-k-Cut problem which is known to be NP-hard [34].
An instance of the Max-k-Cut problem is given by an arbitrary undirected connected graph G = (V,E),
and the goal is to find a partition (V1, . . . , Vk) of the vertices V with maximum number of crossing
edges, i.e., max(V1,...,Vk) |δ(V1, . . . , Vk)|, where
δ(V1, . . . , Vk) := {e = (u, v) ∈ E : u ∈ Vi, v ∈ Vj for i 6= j}.
Given G = (V,E) with V = {v1, . . . , vn} and E = {e1, . . . , em}, we construct an instance of the resource
allocation problem in the form of a weighted complete graph K with n+m nodes v1, . . . .vn, e1, . . . , em,
Fig. 2. An illustration of the reduction in the proof of Theorem 3. The original graph G with 4 vertices and 3 edges is given on the
left. The complete graph K with 7 nodes is given on the right. Each solid edge in K has weight 1, and each dashed edge has weight 2.
V1, V2, and V3 denote a Max-3-Cut on G. Equivalently, the resource allocation on the right figure with three resources (blue, red, and
black) is an optimal allocation on K. In this example, E1 = {e2}, E2 = {e3}, and E3 = {e1}. In particular, (V1, E1), (V2, E2) and
(V3, E3) denote the optimal resource classes for red, blue, and black resources, respectively.
where the weight of every edge (vi, vj) equals 1, and the weight of every edge (ei, ej) equals 2. Moreover,
we set the weight of an edge (vi, ej) as being 1 if vi is an end point of ej in the graph G, and as being
2, otherwise (see Figure 2). Thus, K is a complete graph with all of the edges having weights of either
1 or 2. Clearly by this construction, the edge weights of this complete graph K (i.e., the access costs)
satisfy the triangle inequality, and hence are metric. We claim that finding an optimal allocation with k
resources on K is equivalent to solving the Max-k-Cut problem on G.
Consider an arbitrary k-resources allocation on K, and for any i ∈ [k] let (Vi, Ei) be the nodes
which are allocated resource i. Note that (V1, . . . , Vk) and (E1, . . . , Ek) form a partition of V and E,
respectively. Now let E[Vi] = {e = (u, v) ∈ E : u ∈ Vi, v ∈ Vi} be the set of all of the edges with both
endpoints in Vi. Now for any e ∈ E[Vi], i ∈ [k], the cost of e for obtaining access to all of the resources
is at least 2k − 3. This is because if e ∈ E[Vi], then both end points of e belong to Vi. Therefore, in
the best case even if e ∈ Ej for some j 6= i, the cost of accessing all the resources for e is at least
0 + 1 + 2(k−2) = 2k−3; a cost of 1 for accessing the resource in i and a cost of 2 for accessing other
k− 2 resources in (V`, E`), ` 6= i, j. Moreover, every vertex in V incurs a cost of at least k− 1 as it has
to access k − 1 different resources at distance at least 1 from it. In addition, every e ∈ E \ ∪ki=1E[Vi]
incurs a cost of at least 0 + 1 + 1 + 2(k− 3) = 2k− 4, due to the fact that e has exactly two end points
in V , meaning that in the complete graph K exactly two of the links adjacent to e have weight 1 (and
all others have weight 2). Therefore, the social cost of this allocation is at least
(2k − 3)| ∪ki=1 E[Vi]|+ (k − 1)n+ (2k − 4)(m− | ∪ki=1 E[Vi]|)
= (k − 1)n+ (2k − 4)m+
k∑
i=1
|E[Vi]|
= (k − 1)n+ (2k − 3)m− |δ(V1, . . . , Vk)|, (5)
where in the last equality we have used
∑k
i=1 |E[Vi]| = m− |δ(V1, . . . , Vk)|.
Next, we take a k-cut V1, . . . , Vk on G, and build a solution to the resource allocation problem on K.
For this purpose, let δ(Vi, Vj) = {e = (u, v) ∈ E : u ∈ Vi, v ∈ Vj}, and consider the allocation partition
(Vi, Ei), i ∈ [k]:
E1 = E[V2] ∪
(
∪i,j 6=1 δ(Vi, Vj)
)
,
Ei = E[Vi+1] ∪ δ(V1, Vi+1), for i = 2, . . . , k − 1,
Ek = E[V1] ∪ δ(V1, V2). (6)
Now one can easily check that in this allocation each vertex v ∈ V has a cost of k − 1, each e ∈
E[Vi], i ∈ [k] has a cost of 2k − 3, and each e ∈ δ(Vi, Vj), i 6= j has a cost of 2k − 4. This means that
the lower bound in (5) is achieved for the resource allocation sets (Vi, Ei), i ∈ [k] where Ei, i ∈ [k] are
defined by (6). This shows that an optimal resource allocation is given by arg min(V1,...,Vk)(k − 1)n +
(2k − 3)m− |δ(V1, . . . , Vk)|. Since (k − 1)n + (2k − 3)m is constant, finding an optimal allocation is
equivalent to finding a solution to the Max-k-Cut on G.
Remark 1: In the second part of the above proof we have implicitly assumed that Vi 6= ∅,∀i ∈ [k].
This can be assumed without any loss of generality as if only V1, . . . , Vp 6= ∅, for some p < k, then the
lower bound in (5) on the minimum social cost would reduce to (k−1)n+(2k−3)m−|δ(V1, . . . , Vp)|.
But since the optimal value of the Max-k-Cut is no less than the optimal value of the Max-p-Cut,
min(V1,V2,...,Vk)(k − 1)n + (2k − 3)m − |δ(V1, V2, . . . , Vk)| is not larger than min(V1,V2,...,Vp)(k − 1)n +
(2k − 3)m− |δ(V1, V2, . . . , Vp)|. Hence we may assume Vi 6= ∅,∀i ∈ [k].
The following theorem shows that for k ≥ 3 even approximating the optimal resource allocation
better than a certain constant factor is a hard problem.
Theorem 4: Unless P=NP, for k ≥ 3 there is no polynomial time approximation algorithm with
performance guarantee better than 1+ 1
102k2
for the optimal resource allocation with metric access costs.
Proof: It has been shown in [35] that if P6=NP, no polynomial time approximation algorithm
can achieve an approximation factor better than 1− 1
34k
for the Max-k-Cut problem. Given an arbitrary
undirected graph G with n nodes and m edges, let us consider the same reduction as the one given in the
proof of Theorem 3. Now to derive a contradiction, assume that the optimal resource allocation with k
resources admits a polynomial time (1+ 1
102k2
)-approximation algorithm. Let (k−1)n+(2k−3)m−|δ(V˜ )|
be the overall cost of the solution generated by this approximation algorithm when it is applied on K,
where V˜ = (V˜1, . . . , V˜k) denotes the set of vertex partitions generated by the approximation algorithm.
Therefore, if we denote a solution to Max-k-Cut on G by V o = (V o1 , . . . , V ok ), we must have
(k − 1)n+ (2k − 3)m− |δ(V˜ )| ≤ (1 + 1
102k2
)[(k − 1)n+ (2k − 3)m− |δ(V o)|].
By rearranging the terms we obtain,
|δ(V˜ )| ≥ (1 + 1
102k2
)|δ(V o)| − 1
102k2
[(k − 1)n+ (2k − 3)m]
≥ (1− 1
34k
)|δ(V o)|+ 1
34k
|δ(V o)| − 1
102k2
[(k − 1)n+ (2k − 3)m]
≥ (1− 1
34k
)|δ(V o)|+ 1
34k
(1− 1
k
)m− 3(k − 1)
102k2
m
= (1− 1
34k
)|δ(V o)|, (7)
where in the last inequality we have used the fact that m ≥ n, and |δ(V o)| ≥ (1− 1
k
)m. Note that the
bound |δ(V o)| ≥ (1− 1
k
)m can be obtained using a standard probabilistic argument: choose each vertex
in G to be in one of the k partition sets with probability 1
k
. Then the expected number of edges in the
cut is (1− 1
k
)m, and hence, the size of the optimal solution to Max-k-Cut is at least (1− 1
k
)m. But (7)
implies that the Max-k-Cut can be approximated within a factor of 1− 1
34k
, which is a contradiction.
A. Complexity of Optimal Resource Allocation with Heterogeneous Request Rates
We complete the results of this section by providing another complexity result which essentially
shows that if we consider the optimal resource allocation (2) with heterogeneous request rates, i.e,
min
P∈Ok
n∑
i=1
∑
`∈O
ωi(o`)ci,i(`),
where ωi(o`) ≥ 0 is the request rate received by agent i for the resource o`, then as opposed to Theorem
3 finding an optimal allocation with even k = 2 becomes NP-hard.
Theorem 5: It is NP-hard to find the optimal resource allocation with heterogeneous request rates
even for k = 2 resources and metric access costs.
Proof: We use reduction from the vertex cover problem. An instance of the vertex cover problem
is given by an arbitrary undirected graph G = (V,E), and the goal is to find a minimum cardinality
subset of vertices which covers all of the edges (i.e., each edge has at least one end point in that subset).
It is known that this problem is NP-hard. Given an arbitrary instance of the vertex cover G = (V,E)
with V = {v1, . . . , vn} and E = {e1, . . . , em}, let K be the same weighted complete graph with n+m
nodes as in the proof of Theorem 3. Moreover, let us denote the available resources by O = {o1, o2},
and assume all of the vertices v ∈ V have request rates wv(o1) = 35 and wv(o2) = 25 for the resources
o1 and o2, respectively. In addition, we let all the nodes e ∈ E have request rates we(o1) = 34 and
we(o2) =
1
4
. We will show that finding an optimal allocation with these request rates on K is equivalent
to finding the minimum vertex cover on G.
First we note that in an optimal allocation at least one of the nodes in V must cache o2. Otherwise,
let e ∈ E be a node holding o22 and consider one of its end points v ∈ V . Then by assigning o1 to e
and o2 to v, the cost of all of the other nodes in (V \{v})∪ (E \{e}) will not increase. This is the case
because by this change all of the nodes in V \ {v} are still within a distance of 1 from resource o2.
Moreover, all the nodes in E \ {e} are within a distance of 1 from resource o1 (as each edge in E has
two endpoints), and within at most the same distance as before from resource o2. By this change the
total cost of nodes v and e becomes 3
5
+ 1
4
= 17
20
, while before this change it was 2
5
+ 3
4
= 23
20
. Since the
former is strictly less than the latter, this contradicts the optimality of the initial allocation. Similarly,
one can show that at least one of the nodes in V must cache o1. Otherwise, if all of the nodes in V
are holding resource o2, then by choosing an arbitrary node v ∈ V and assigning resource o1 to it, the
costs of all of the other n+m− 1 nodes do not increase while the cost of node v decreases by at least
3
5
− 2
5
= 1
5
, which is a contradiction.
Next we claim that in an optimal allocation all of the nodes in E must cache resource o1. Otherwise,
assume that i ≥ 1 of the nodes in E have resource o2 and the remaining m − i nodes have resource
o1. Since both resources appear at least once among the nodes in V and the access costs between these
nodes is 1, the access costs of the nodes in V are fully determined by themselves regardless of resource
allocation in E. Therefore, if we switch o2 to o1 in all the i nodes in E, the cost of the initial (optimal)
allocation minus that of the new allocation would be at least i × 3
4
× 1 − i × 1
4
× 2 > 0. This again
contradicts the optimality of the initial allocation, and hence the claim follows.
Finally, let p be the number of nodes in V which are holding resource o2, and j be the number of
nodes in E with at least one end point among these p nodes (or equivalently, j is the number of edges
adjacent to these p vertices in the graph G). Then the overall cost of such allocation equals(
j × 1
4
× 1 + (m− j)× 1
4
× 2
)
+
(
p× 3
5
× 1 + (n− p)× 2
5
× 1
)
= (
2n
5
+
m
2
) + (
p
5
− j
4
).
Therefore, in order to achieve the optimal allocation we need to minimize p
5
− j
4
in the above expression
as all the other terms are constant. But this minimum is achieved when j takes its maximum value, i.e.,
j = m. This is because if j < m, let e∗ = (u, v) ∈ E be such that none of its endpoints are among
the p vertices holding resource o2. Then increasing p to p+ 1 by allowing u to cache resource o2, the
value of j will also increase to at least j + 1 (since now at least e∗ is also covered). As a result the
value of p
5
− j
4
decreases to at most p+1
5
− j+1
4
= p
5
− j
4
− 1
20
, which shows that in order to achieve the
2Note that at least one node has the resource o2, otherwise, the allocation cost will be infinity.
minimum we must have j = m. This means that the set of p nodes holding resource o2 must form a
vertex cover for G. As we are looking for the minimum value of p
5
− j
4
, thus p must be the cardinality
of the minimum vertex cover. Therefore, an allocation profile on K is optimal if and only if it assigns
resource o2 to those nodes in V forming a minimum vertex cover on G, and resource o1 to the remaining
nodes. This completes the proof.
IV. AN APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM FOR THE OPTIMAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION
As we saw in Theorem 4, it seems computationally hard to approximate the optimal resource allocation
better than a certain constant factor. Therefore, an important question concerns how closely one can
approximate the optimal allocation. In this section we show that if the access costs satisfy the metric
property one can quickly obtain a 3-approximation of the optimal allocation with identical request rates.
Theorem 6: There is a deterministic 3-approximation algorithm for the optimal resource allocation
(2) with metric access costs which runs in linear time O(n).
Proof: Consider a greedy algorithm in which at each round t = 1, . . . , n, we select arbitrarily
an unselected node and assign to it the farthest resource with respect to previously assigned resources.
Ties are broken arbitrarily. We claim that the resource allocation profile P obtained at the end of
this process when all the nodes are processed exactly once (i.e. t = n) is a 3-approximation of the
optimal allocation (2). Consider an arbitrary node (which without loss of generality we assume to be
node 1) and relabel all the other nodes based on their access costs from node 1 by 2, 3, . . . , n, i.e.,
0 = c11 ≤ c12 ≤ c13 ≤ . . . ≤ c1n. In this sequence, let j ≥ 2 be a node of smallest index such that
|{P1, . . . , Pj−1, Pj}| = |{P1, . . . , Pj−1}| = j − 1.
Let j′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , j − 1} be the other node which has the same resource as node j, and define tj
and tj′ be the time instances that j and j′ are selected and assigned a resource by the algorithm,
respectively. Finally, let us denote the set of all the nodes whose access cost from node 1 is at most
3c1j by S = {i ∈ [n] : c1i ≤ 3c1j}.
We claim that in the final allocation profile P each resource is assigned to at least one node in S, i.e.,
|{Pi : i ∈ S}| = k. Otherwise, let us assume that there exists at least one resource o which is missing
among the nodes in S at this final profile P . Consider the time tˆ = max{tj, tj′} where jˆ ∈ {j, j′}
is selected by the algorithm. Note that at this time, each resource is assigned to at least one node
(otherwise, there is no reason on why the algorithm should assign a repeated resource to node jˆ). Since
resource o is missing among the nodes in S at the final allocation P , clearly it is also missing at time
tˆ among the nodes in S. Thus, if we let j′′ be the closest node to node jˆ at time tˆ which has resource
o in its cache, then c1j′′ > 3c1j . Moreover, we have cjˆj′′ ≤ cjj′ , otherwise, since the algorithm assigns
the farthest resource to jˆ at time tˆ, it must have selected resource o and assigned it to jˆ. Given that
access costs are metric and c1jˆ ≤ max{c1j, c1j′} = c1j , we can write
c1j′′ ≤ c1jˆ + cjˆj′′ ≤ c1j + cjj′ ≤ c1j + c1j + c1j′ ≤ 3c1j.
This contradicts c1j′′ > 3c1j , and the claim follows.
Finally, let us denote an optimal resource allocation profile by P o. Clearly the cost of node 1 in P o
is at least
C1(P
o) ≥
j−1∑
`=1
c1` + (k − j + 1)c1j. (8)
This is because at best, node 1 can get access to j − 1 of the resources through nodes 1, 2, . . . , j − 1,
and access the remaining k− j+ 1 resources at a cost of c1j . On the other hand, since in the allocation
P all of the resources which are assigned to nodes 1, . . . , j − 1 are distinct while all of the resources
appear at least once in S (which are of distance at most 3c1j from node 1), the cost of node 1 is at
most
C1(P ) ≤
j−1∑
`=1
c1` + (k − j + 1)3c1j. (9)
Therefore, from (8) and (9) we have C1(P ) ≤ 3C1(P o). Since node 1 was chosen arbitrarily, by summing
this relation over all the nodes we obtain C(P ) ≤ 3C(P o).
Next in the following we show that the above approximation factor is nearly tight meaning that the
greedy algorithm cannot achieve a performance guarantee better than 2 even over unweighted networks
with graphical distance access costs. Given arbitrary positive integer k ≥ 2, let us consider a network of
n := k(k−1) nodes as shown in Figure 3. Here we denote the resources by {o1, o1, . . . , ok}. The bottom
part of the network is composed of a clique of k − 1 nodes, and the top part forms an independent set
of (k−1)2 nodes, all of which are connected to the bottom part. The top figure constitutes an output of
the greedy algorithm where the algorithm iteratively selects one node from each resource cluster until
all the nodes are selected exactly once. Here we assume that ties are broken accordingly so that the
number of resources of each type at the end of the algorithm is the same and equals to k− 1 (as shown
in the top figure). Therefore, the total cost of such allocation which is achieved by the greedy algorithm
is equal to
C(greedy) = (k − 1)[(k − 1)(1 + (k − 2)× 2)] + (k − 1)2 = 2(k − 1)3,
where the first term is the total cost of all the nodes that belong to resource classes o2, . . . , ok, and the
second term is the overall cost of all the nodes that belong to the resource class o1 (black nodes). On
the other hand, it can be seen easily that the bottom figure illustrates an optimal allocation where the
cost of each node equals k − 1 with an overall optimal cost of C(OPT) = k(k − 1)2. Thus, we have
C(greedy) = (2 − 2
k
)C(OPT). This shows that for large k the greedy algorithm can perform nearly
twice worse than the optimal algorithm.
Fig. 3. Illustration of the resource allocation obtained by the greedy algorithm (top figure), and an optimal allocation (bottom figure).
V. RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME
In this section we consider a selfish version of the optimal resource allocation problem formulated
as a noncooperative game between nodes (players). More formally we consider a noncooperative game
with n players (one player per node). Each player has access to the set of all of the resources but can
only select one of the resources to be in its cache. In other words, an action for player i ∈ [n] is to
choose only one resource Pi ∈ [k]. Finally, given an allocation (action) profile P , the cost of player i
is naturally given as before by (1):
Ci(P ) :=
∑
`∈O
ci,i(`),
which is the minimum cost player i incurs to access all the resources.
Remark 2: One can extend the results of this section to the games of heterogeneous cache size in
which different players may have different cache sizes. This can be done by replacing a player of cache
size ui with ui collocated players of unit cache size. Now finding a NE for this unit cache size game,
one can obtain a NE for the original instance by putting together cache contents of all the ui collocated
players which are associated with the ui-cache size player.
The above resource allocation game for ultra-metric access costs was first introduced by [18] where it
was shown that such a game always admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, henceforth referred to as
NE.3 However, the complexity of finding a NE under best-response dynamics, where at each iteration
only one player updates its action by caching its most favorite resource, was left open. In particular, it
was conjectured in [18] that for general access costs finding a NE is PLS-hard. Here we take the first
affirmative step toward settling this conjecture by showing that finding a NE with k ≥ 3 resources is
equivalent to finding a flip-optimal solution of Max-k-Cut over a weighted complete graph of n nodes
and exactly one edge of weight 2i, i = 0, . . . ,
(
n
2
) − 1. As solving Max-k-Cut using flip local moves
is known to be PLS-hard [33], this strongly suggests that finding a NE using best response updates is
also PLS-hard. But before we study the complexity of finding a NE, we first provide a positive result
about approximability of the NE points under metric access costs.
Definition 1: Given β > 1, an allocation profile P is called a β-NE if no player can unilaterally
deviate and reduce its cost by a factor of more than β, i.e., Ci(P ) ≤ βCi(P ′i , P−i),∀P ′i ∈ [k],∀i ∈ [n].4
Proposition 7: For the metric access costs, the allocation profile obtained at the end of the greedy
algorithm is a 3-NE.
Proof: As we saw earlier in the proof of Theorem 6, the allocation profile P obtained at the
end of the greedy algorithm has the property that for every arbitrary node (say node 1), C1(P ) ≤∑j−1
`=1 c1` + (k− j + 1)3c1j . Since the cost of node 1 in any allocation profile, and in particular for any
deviation, is at least
∑j−1
`=1 c1` + (k − j + 1)c1j , we immediately conclude that P is a 3-NE.
Definition 2: Given a feasible allocation profile P , let us denote the set of players holding resource
` in their cache by V `. For an arbitrary vertex i ∈ V , we define d(i, V `) := min{cij : j ∈ V `, j 6= i}.
Geometrically, d(i, V `) can be thought of as the distance between vertex i and its projection on the
set V ` \ {i}. Viewing in this way, one can interpret the greedy algorithm as a successive “projection”
algorithm which sequentially releases a new vertex i and includes it into the set arg maxV ` d(i, V `) which
has the farthest projected distance from i. While Proposition 7 shows that it is possible to compute an
approximate NE, it does not help in finding an exact NE. Therefore, in the remainder of this section
our goal is to develop a methodology for studying the complexity of finding a NE under general (not
necessarily metric) access costs.
3If we instead consider the heterogeneous game where players have different request rates for different resources, then one can easily
show that the game does not necessarily admit a pure NE even for k = 3 resources. In fact, this is one of the main reasons that at the
first place we restricted our attention to the homogeneous setting.
4Note that for β = 1 this definition reduces to the exact definition of a NE.
A. From Nash Equilibrium to Max-k-Cut
Let us consider an arbitrary allocation profile P and assume that player i deviates by changing its
resource from Pi to P ′i . This means that player i leaves its resource class from V
Pi to V P ′i . Such a
deviation will change the cost of player i by
Ci(P
′
i , P−i)− Ci(P ) = d(i, V Pi)− d(i, V P
′
i ).
As a result an allocation profile P is a NE if and only if d(i, V Pi)− d(i, V P ′i ) ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ [n], ∀P ′i ∈ [k],
or equivalently,
d(i, V Pi) = max
`∈[k]
d(i, V `), ∀i ∈ [n]. (10)
In other words, in a NE the distance of each node to its own resource class must be the largest among
its distances to other resource classes. While (10) suggests that a resource allocation profile is a NE (or
close to a NE) if the elements within each class V ` have large pairwise distances, a dual approach is
to find a resource partition with small pairwise distances across different resource classes.
To formalize this idea, given an allocation profile P , let us write i P j if nodes i and j do not
belong to the same resource class induced by P . Consider the multiset Ψ(P ) := {cij : i P j},
where the elements of this set are sorted in an increasing order (e.g. {1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 4}). Now if player
i changes its resource from Pi to P ′i , the resulting new multiset associated with P
′ = (P ′i , P−i) can
be obtained from Ψ(P ) by removing the elements N ′i := {cij, j ∈ V P ′i}, and adding new elements
Ni := {cij, j ∈ V Pi \ {i}}, i.e.,
Ψ(P ′) = (Ψ(P ) \N ′i) ∪Ni, (11)
where here the union and subtraction are with respect to multisets (i.e., repetition of elements are
allowed). Now if player i’s deviation is a strictly better move so that Ci(P ′i , P−i) < Ci(P ), this means
that d(i, V Pi) < d(i, V P ′i ). As d(i, V P ′i ) = minN ′i , and d(i, V
Pi) = minNi, this implies that Ψ(P ′) is
lexicographically smaller than Ψ(P ). This shows that after every strictly better move by a player i, the
sorted multiset Ψ(P ) strictly decreases lexicographically. As a result, after a finitely many number of
moves we reach an allocation profile P ∗ with lexicographically smallest multiset Ψ(P ∗), which must
be a NE (as no player can perform a strictly better move). Although this provides an inefficient way of
proving the existence of a NE, a major question here is how many of such better moves can happen in
the worst case. In particular, how can we leverage this multiset potential function to find a NE more
efficiently? To address these questions we next consider the following definition:
Definition 3: An instance of Max-k-Cut is called flip-optimal if the cut value cannot be increased by
moving a single vertex from one partition set to another one.
Theorem 8: Consider an arbitrary instance of the resource allocation game with n players and distinct
access costs ce0 > ce1 > . . . > cem , where m =
(
n
2
)−1, and each ei represents a distinct pair of players.
Let K be a weighted complete graph of n nodes with edge ei having weights 2i. Then, an allocation
profile P is a NE for the resource allocation game if and only if the resource classes induced by P
constitute a flip-optimal solution to Max-k-Cut on K.
Proof: Given sorted access costs ce0 > ce1 > . . . > cem in the resource allocation instance, let us
consider the weighted complete graph K in which the edge corresponding to ei has weight 2i. Now let
us consider an arbitrary NE profile P with corresponding resource classes V `, ` ∈ [k]. If this partition
is not flip-optimal for Max-k-Cut on K, this means that by moving a vertex v from some V 1 to V 2
we can strictly improve the value of the cut. Let ei1 , . . . , eir , where i1 < . . . < ir, denote all the edges
between v and the vertices in V 2. Similarly let ej1 , . . . , ejs , where j1 < . . . < js, denote all the edges
between v and the vertices in V 1 \ {v}. Since moving v from V 1 to V 2 strictly improves the value of
the cut, we must have
2i1 + . . .+ 2ir < 2j1 + . . .+ 2js .
This implies that js > ir, and hence, cejs < ceir . As cejs = min{cej1 , . . . , cejs} and ceir = min{cei1 , . . . , ceir},
we conclude that such a move from V 1 to V 2 is also a strictly better move for player v. This is because
before such deviation, the cost of player v for accessing resources ` = 1 and ` = 2 were 0 and ceir ,
respectively. However, after that deviation the cost of player v for accessing resources ` = 1 and ` = 2
becomes cejs and 0, respectively. As cost of player v for accessing all the other resources ` /∈ {1, 2}
remains unchanged, this shows that the cost of player v due to its deviation strictly reduces by exactly
ceir − cejs > 0. This contradicts the fact that P was a NE.
Conversely, assume that V `, ` ∈ [k] form a flip-optimal solution to Max-k-Cut on K. By contradiction,
assume that {V `, ` ∈ [k]}, viewed as resource classes, do not constitute a NE. By NE characterization
given in (10), this means that there exists a player v, and two resource classes V 1 and V 2, such that
v ∈ V 1 and d(v, V 1) < d(v, V 2). Since d(v, V 1) = cejs and d(v, V 2) = ceir , we must have js > ir.
Hence by moving vertex v from V1 to V2, the value of the cut strictly increase by exactly,
2j1 + . . .+ 2js − (2i1 + . . .+ 2ir) ≥ 2js − (1 + . . .+ 2ir)
= 2js − 2ir+1 + 1 ≥ 1,
where the last inequality holds since js > ir. However, this contradicts flip-optimality of V `, ` ∈ [k],
which completes the proof.
Remark 3: One can easily extend the statement of Theorem 8 to the case where the access costs in
the original instance are not distinct. This can be simply done by encoding the original access costs into
K using weights {1, n, . . . , nm} (rather than powers of two). A straightforward calculation shows that
all the above results can be carried over to this generalized setting where now there could be multiple
edges of the same weight ni. We note that even in this generalized case, the length of the input size is
still polynomial in terms of the problem description, as log nm = O(n2 log n).
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 8, for finding a NE the actual values of the access costs cij
are not important: what really matters is the relative size of these access costs. In other words, every
two collections of access costs {cij} and {cˆij} which have the same relative order (i.e., cij > cpq if and
only if cˆij > cˆpq) will have identical sets of NE points. Next, we show in the following theorem that
finding a NE with lexicographically smallest multiset (potential) is an NP-hard problem.
Definition 4: A graph is called k-colorable if there exists an assignment of at most k colors to its
vertices with no adjacent monochromatic vertices.
Theorem 9: It is NP-hard to find the lexicographically smallest NE of the resource allocation game
for k ≥ 3 resources. Moreover, there is a deterministic algorithm to find such a NE after at most
O(n32n) steps.
Proof: By Theorem 8 it is enough to show that solving Max-k-Cut (k ≥ 3) on a complete graph K
with edge weights 1, 2, . . . , 2m is NP-hard. This implies that finding the lexicographically smallest NE
which is associated with the optimal Max-k-Cut on K is also NP-hard. Let us consider the edges of K
in a decreasing order of weights by eˆm, . . . , eˆ0 where edge eˆi has weight 2i. Initially set Em = {eˆm}. For
each i = m− 1, . . . , 0, let Ei = Ei+1 ∪{eˆi} if the induced graph (V,Ei) is k-colorable, and Ei = Ei+1,
otherwise. It is easy to see that at the end of this process E0 spans all of the vertices of V . Let
V ` = {v ∈ V : v has color `}, ` ∈ [k],
be the color classes of the k-proper coloring on (V,E0). We claim that {V `}`∈[k] constitutes an optimal
solution to the Max-k-Cut problem on K with cut edges E0. This is the case because in any optimal
Max-k-Cut solution no edge of weight 2i can be discarded from being in the cut for the sake of selecting
edges of lower weights 2i−1, . . . , 1 (note that all of these lower weight edges have a total weight of at
most 2i− 1). More precisely, let eˆj be the edge of maximum weight which has appeared in the optimal
cut but not in E0. Since Ej+1 cannot contain an edge outside of the optimal cut edges (otherwise
by the above property of powers of 2 the value of the cut edges in Ej+1 will be more than that of
the optimal cut), we conclude that all of the edges in Ej+1 must be present in the optimal cut. As
at iteration j the edge eˆj is a feasible choice of highest weight for the algorithm, so we must have
Ej = Ej+1 ∪ {ej} ⊆ E0. This contradiction shows that every edge which is present in the optimal cut
must also be in E0. Therefore, by running the k-coloring algorithm at most m = O(n2) times, we can
find an optimal solution to the Max-k-Cut problem on K. It is known that the k-coloring algorithm for
a graph of n nodes and any k can be solved in O(n2n), so the above process delivers a NE in at most
O(n32n) steps.
Finally, given an arbitrary graph G with n nodes and r edges, we can encode G into K by assigning
weights 2m, . . . , 2m−r+1 to its r edges and assigning weights 2m−r, . . . , 1 to the edges of G-complement
(in any arbitrary order). Now it is easy to see that the graph G is k-colorable if and only if the
optimal solution to Max-k-Cut on K returns a proper k-coloring for G. Therefore, if we can find the
lexicographically smallest NE of any instance of the resource allocation game efficiently, we can also
find a proper k-coloring for any graph G efficiently. This completes the hardness proof.
Corollary 1: As checking 2-colorability of a graph can be done in polynomial time, thus for k = 2
resources a NE can be found in polynomial time.
VI. NASH EQUILIBRIUM COMPUTATION
In this section we take one step further toward computing the NE points. As seen earlier it is
computationally hard to find the lexicographically smallest NE in any instance of the resource allocation
game. But what if we only want to find one of such equilibrium points? In that case we do not
necessarily need to solve the global optimum of the Max-k-Cut problem on K. Thanks to Theorem 8
on the equivalence between the set of NE points and flip-optimal solutions of the weighted Max-k-Cut
problem, below we provide a different characterization of the NE points in terms of integral local
minima of a quadratic function. Leveraging this characterization, we propose two new algorithms to
find a pure NE in a more systematic manner for any general instance of the resource allocation game.
It is well-known [36], [37] that the Max-k-Cut problem on a complete graph K with edge weights
{aij} can be formulated as the following quadratic integer program:
min
1
2
k∑
`=1
n∑
i,j=1
aijx
`
ix
`
j
k∑
`=1
x`i = 1,∀i ∈ [n]
x`i ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ [n], ` ∈ [k], (12)
where x`i = 1, if and only if node i belongs to the `-th partition set. Note that the objective function in
(12) computes the total sum of edge weights within partition sets V ` = {i : x`i = 1}, ` ∈ [k]. However,
as the total sum of the edge weights
∑
i,j aij is constant, minimizing the total sum of edge weights
within partition sets is equivalent to maximizing the total sum of edge weights across them. Therefore,
a solution to (12) will be a solution to the Max-k-Cut problem on K.
On the other hand, it has been shown in [37, Theorem 1] that a natural relaxation of the quadratic
program (12) which is obtained by replacing its integral constraints x`i ∈ {0, 1} by x`i ≥ 0, always admits
an integral solution. Thus, without any loss of generality, we can consider the relaxed quadratic program
in (12), and derive the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions for its optimal solutions. Doing
that, we obtain the following set of KKT conditions [37, Theorem 2]:
r`i − λi ≥ 0, ∀i, `
r`i =
∑
j
aijx
`
j, ∀i, `
(r`i − λi)x`i = 0, ∀i, `∑
`
x`i = 1,∀i.
x`i ≥ 0,∀i, `, (13)
where λi denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
∑k
`=1 x
`
i = 1.
Lemma 1: [36, Theorem 1] A feasible solution (x`i) to Max-k-Cut on K is flip-optimal, if and only
if, it is an integral feasible solution to the KKT conditions (13).
Now we state one of the main results of this section which allows to view NE points of the resource
allocation game as integral local minima of a quadratic function over the polytope of stochastic matrices.
We then leverage this characterization to devise more efficient algorithms towards obtaining NE points.
Theorem 10: Given an arbitrary instance of the resource allocation game, let A = (aij) be the edge-
weight matrix of its associated weighted complete graph K. Moreover, let X = (x`i) ∈ {0, 1}n×k be
a feasible resource allocation profile where x`i = 1 if and only if player i caches resource `. Then, X
is a NE, if and only if, it is an integral local minimum of g(X) = 1
2
tr(XTAX) with respect to the
Frobenius norm (S, ‖ · ‖), where S denotes the polytope of stochastic matrices of size n× k.
Proof: Let us rewrite the KKT conditions (13) in a slightly different form: First we replace the
last two constraints in (13) by X ∈ S. Moreover, the second constraint can be written as R = AX ,
where R = (r`i ) ∈ Rn×k+ . Finally, the first and third constraints together imply λi = min` r`i ,∀i (i.e., λi
is equal to the smallest entry in the i-th row of R). Next we write the objective function in (12) in a
matrix form as:
g(X) :=
1
2
k∑
`=1
n∑
i,j=1
aijx
`
jx
`
i =
1
2
tr(XTAX).
According to the necessary conditions of optimality, X is an integral local minimum of g(·) over
(S, ‖·‖), if it an integral feasible solution of KKT conditions (13). Using Lemma 1, an integral solution
to KKT conditions must be flip-optimal to Max-k-Cut on K. This in view of Theorem 8 shows that X
must be a NE.
Conversely, if X is a NE for the resource allocation game, by Theorem 8 it must be a flip-optimal
solution to Max-k-Cut on K. Therefore, by Lemma 1, X forms an integral solution to the KKT
constraints (13). Moreover, every two nonzero columns of X must be distinct, otherwise we would
have at least two 1’s in the same row of X , contradicting the stochasticity of X . Moreover, since every
row of A contains different powers of 2 (recall that each entry aij of A is a distinct number from
{1, 2, . . . , 2m}), all the elements in the ith row of R = AX are distinct. This is simply because the
binary representation of the elements in the ith row of R are given by the columns of X , which we
just showed to be distinct. As a result, for each i, the minimum entry in the ith row of R is determined
uniquely. Since X satisfies KKT conditions, λi = min` r`i ,∀i. This shows that for each i ∈ [n], there
exists exactly one `(i) such that λi = r
`(i)
i , and r
`
i > λi, ∀` 6= `(i). In other words, exactly n of the
constraints r`i − λi ≥ 0 in (13) are tight. Finally, it has been shown in [37, Theorem 3] that if X is a
feasible solution to the KKT conditions for which exactly n of the constraints r`i − λi ≥ 0 are tight,
then X must be a local minimum of g(·) over (S, ‖ · ‖). This completes the proof.
As a result of Theorem 10, finding a NE is equivalent to finding an integral local minima of g(·) with
respect to the conventional Frobenius norm (S, ‖ · ‖). This lays down the main idea of the following
two algorithms which systematically aim to find an integral local minima of min{g(X) : X ∈ S}. The
first algorithm resembles a simplex type method which explores the extreme points of S in a systematic
manner until an integral local minima is achieved. The second algorithm however allows cutting through
the feasible region S, and uses some ideas from gradient decent method together with an appropriate
randomized rounding to find an integral local minima.
A. A Bilinear Algorithm for Finding a NE
Our first Bilinear Algorithm for finding a NE starts from an approximate NE generated by the greedy
algorithm, and proceeds in several finite length rounds. At the end of each round the algorithm finds
an integral stationary point X∗ which is very likely to be a NE. Otherwise, if X∗ is not a NE, an
unsatisfied player i is identified and a strict better move is executed. The algorithm then continuous to
start a new round. A formal description of this algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 (Bilinear Algorithm)
1: Run the greedy algorithm to find an approximate NE, X(0) and set R(0) = AX(0).
2: For fixed X(t) solve the linear program min{tr((X(t))TR) : AX = R,X ∈ S}, and let R(t+1) be
its optimal solution.
3: For fixed R(t+1) solve the linear program min{tr(XTR(t+1)) : X ∈ S}, and let X(t+1) be its optimal
integral solution. If X(t+1) = X(t), go to step 4. Otherwise, set t = t+ 1 and go to step 2.
4: Set X∗ = X(t) and check whether X∗ satisfies the KKT conditions (13). If “Yes” output X∗ as
a NE. Otherwise, identify an unsatisfied player i in the allocation profile X∗ and let him play his
best response. Set X(t+1) to be the allocation profile obtained after this deviation. Set t = t + 1,
and go to step 2.
Proposition 11: Algorithm 1 correctly returns a NE after finitely many steps.
Proof: Clearly, if the algorithm terminates, the output integral allocation X∗ would be a NE (as it
must satisfy KKT conditions). Thus, we only need to argue that the algorithm indeed terminates after
finitely many steps. To see this, we note that
tr((X(t))TR(t)) > tr((X(t))TR(t+1)) > tr((X(t+1))TR(t+1)),
where the first inequality is by step 2 and the second inequality is by step 3. Therefore, after every
execution of steps 2 and 3 the value of tr(XTR) strictly decreases. Moreover, given that X(t) and R(t)
change over finitely many extreme points of polytopes S and R = {R = AX : X ∈ S}, respectively,
after finitely many iterations we must end up at a stationary point which is when X(t+1) = X(t). In
addition, since at the end of each round one player plays a strictly better response, the value of the
objective function g(X) = tr(XTR) at the beginning of the next round is strictly less than that at the
end of previous round. As this objective function never increases over steps 2 and 3, the algorithm must
eventually terminate after finitely many steps.
B. A Projected Gradient Descent Algorithm for Finding a NE
As we saw earlier, one of the difficulties in finding a NE is the integral nature of pure equilibrium
points. However, one way of dealing with this issue is to allow the algorithm to search over fractional
feasible allocations X ∈ S until a nearly good fractional local minima for min{g(X) : X ∈ S} is
achieved. We can then round this feasible fractional candidate to an integral extreme points of S and
check whether it satisfies KKT conditions (13). In this regard, we propose the following projected
gradient descent algorithm which allows cutting over the interior points of the feasible region.
To describe this algorithm, it is more convenient to rewrite the relaxed optimization problem (12) in
a slightly different form. Let us define H := A⊗Ik×k to be the Kronecker product of A and the identity
matrix Ik×k. Moreover, instead of viewing variables in a matrix form X , we view them as a column
vector x := (x1, . . . ,xn)T , where xi = (x1i , . . . , x
k
i ). Then the relaxed optimization (12) can be written
as
min{g(x) := 1
2
xTHx : Fx ≥ b, x ∈ Rn×k}.
Here F is a n(k+1)×nk constraint matrix whose first n rows correspond to the constraints ∑k`=1 x`i =
1, i ∈ [x], and whose last nk rows form an identity matrix corresponding to the nonnegativity constraints
x`i ≥ 0,∀i, `. Similarly the right-hand side vector b has 1 in its first n entries, and 0 for the remaining
ones. Note that in this form the gradient of the objective function g(·) with respect to vector variable
x is given by Hx. Now we are ready to describe our algorithm which is mainly based on Rosen’s
gradient projection method [38] combined with a randomized rounding step in order to find an integral
solution to the KKT conditions. This has been summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Rounded Projected Gradient Descent
1: Run the greedy algorithm to obtain an initial approximate NE x0, and choose a constant c > 0.
2: For t = 0, 1, 2, . . . and given a solution point xt = (xt1, . . . ,x
t
n)
T , let J t = {j : Fjxt = bj} be the
index set of active constraints at xt, and FJt be a submatrix of F consisting of rows Fj, j ∈ J t.
Let PJt = I −FJt(F TJtFJt)−1F TJt and ut = −(F TJtFJt)−1F TJtHxt. If PJtHxt = 0 and ut ≤ 0, go to
step 3. Otherwise, go to step 4.
3: Randomly and independently round each xti, i ∈ [n] to a unit basic vector using its induced
probability distribution. Let xˆt be the resulting rounded solution. If xˆt satisfies KKT conditions
(13), output xˆt as a NE. Otherwise, set xt+1 = xˆt, t = t+ 1, and go to step 2.
4: Let uth = max{utj : j ∈ J t} and choose a descent feasible direction
dt =
{
−PJtHxt, if ‖PJtHxt‖ > cuth
−PJt\{h}Hxt, if ‖PJtHxt‖ ≤ cuth.
Update xt+1 = xt + αdt, t = t+ 1 and go to step 2. Here α is a step size given by
α =
{
1, if Fdt ≥ 0,
min{ bj−Fjxt
Ajdt
: Fjd
t < 0, j /∈ J t}, else.
Algorithm 2 starts from an approximate NE and iteratively improves the solution by minimizing the
objective function g(·) using a projected gradient descent method. At each major iteration and given a
current feasible solution xt, the algorithm finds a feasible descent direction dt and a step size α such
that xt+1 := xt + αdt remains feasible while the objective value strictly decreases g(xt+1) < g(xt).
The step size α is obtained by a line search so that moving along the feasible direction dt gives
the steepest descent. The feasible direction is obtained by projecting the gradient of the objective
function ∇g(xt) = Hxt to the set of active constraints via the projection matrix PJt . This assures
that moving along dt does not violate any of the active constraints while it is a descent direction.
Here ut can be thought as Lagrange multiplies associated with the active constraints where since
∇g(xt) = PJt∇g(xt)−FJtut, one can show that xt satisfies KKT conditions if and only if PJtHxt = 0
and ut ≤ 0. Now if one of the Lagrange multipliers uhi is very large, it indicates that the corresponding
constraint need not to be in the set of active constraints. In this case the corresponding constraint with
index number h is evicted from the set of active constraints J t and the new projection matrix PJt\{h} is
recalculated to find a feasible descent direction. Following this algorithm we have the following result:
Proposition 12: Algorithm 2 correctly returns a NE in expected finite time.
Proof: It has been shown in [38, Theorem 3.9] that if we only iterate steps 2 and 4 of Algorithm
2 (excluding the rounding step 3), then either the algorithm stops in a finite time at a solution satisfying
the KKT conditions, or generates an infinite sequence whose accumulation points satisfy the KKT
conditions. Moreover, in step 3 of the algorithm, we independently round xi, i ∈ [n] to unit vectors,
that is, for each i ∈ [n] we independently set xˆti = e` with probability (xt)`i . Since rounding is done
independently for distinct i 6= j, by linearity of expectation we have
E[g(xˆt)] = E[
1
2
∑
i,j
aij〈xˆti, xˆtj〉] =
1
2
∑
i,j
aij〈E[xˆti],E[xˆtj]〉 =
1
2
∑
i,j
aij〈xti,xtj〉 = g(xt).
A a result the expected value of the objective function remains the same after rounding step 3. Thus
after each major iteration we obtain a new integral solution xˆt+1 such that E[g(xˆt+1)] = g(xt+1) <
g(xt) = E[g(xˆt)]. This shows that in expectation no integral extreme point of the feasible region is
visited twice, and hence the algorithm terminates in expected finite time. In particular, the convergent
integral point must satisfy KKT conditions as otherwise the algorithm can find a new feasible direction
in step 4 to strictly decrease the value of the objective function. Thus the algorithm must terminate with
an integral local minima, and hence a NE.
Of cource, we have no a priori bound on the expected running time of the above algorithm. However,
in general, projected gradient descent algorithms with proper choice of stepsize are known to converge
relatively fast to stationary points of the objective function [39], [40]. In particular, projected gradient
descent algorithms are typically faster than naive local search methods with slightly more computations
per iteration [41]. Therefore, to evaluate the effectiveness of Algorithm 2, we use a numerical example
to illustrate the outperformance of this algorithm compared to a naive enumeration search for finding a
NE.
1) A Numerical Example: We consider a set of n = 10 players and generate 10 different access cost
matrices with off-diagonal entries uniformly and independently sampled from the set {1, 2, . . . , 244}.
For each instance, we increase the number of resources from k = 2 to k = 9 and run Algorithm 2 until
a NE is found.
The result of this experiment is summarized in Table I. In this table each row corresponds to a
random cost matrix instance Gi, i = 1, . . . , 10, while the columns correspond to different number of
resources. The entries of this table are in the form of triples where the first coordinate denotes the
number of rounding steps (step 3) during the executions of the algorithm, the second coordinate shows
the average number of gradient descent iterations (steps 2 and 4), and the last coordinate shows the
maximum number of gradient descent iterations between two consecutive rounding steps. For instance,
the entry (7, 15.5, 33) corresponding to row G6 and column k = 5 shows that Algorithm 2 has found a
NE after 7 integral rounding, with an average number of 15.5 gradient descent iterations between every
two consecutive rounding stages. Moreover, the maximum number of gradient descent iterations to find
a fractional local minimum is 33.
Finally, given a fixed number of resources k, the pair of entries in the last row of Table I denotes,
respectively, the averaged and the maximum total number of iterations over all the instances Gi, i =
1, . . . , 10. This row of the table has also been illustrated in Figure 4. As it can be seen the total number
of iterations even under the worst case scenario (red curve) is significantly smaller than the total number
of iterations of a naive enumeration search for finding a NE which in general can be of the order of
O(kn). In particular, the maximum running time is at most 3 times worse than the averaged number of
iterations (blue curve) which shows that Algorithm 2 has fairly low variance among all the instances.
Finally, one can see from this figure that the worst case running time happens for some mid-range
number of resources which in this experiment is for k = 5 and k = 6 resources.
TABLE I
RESULT OF APPLYING ALGORITHM 2 FOR FINDING A NE IN THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME FOR n = 10 PLAYERS AND
DIFFERENT NUMBER OF RESOURCES. THE FIRST 10 ROWS CORRESPOND TO TEN DIFFERENT UNIFORMLY SAMPLED ACCESS COST
MATRICES. THE LAST ROW REPRESENTS THE AVERAGE V.S. MAXIMUM NUMBER OF TOTAL ITERATIONS TAKEN OVER ALL THE 10
INSTANCES.
Case k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8 k = 9
G1 1, 6, 6 1, 8, 8 2, 12, 13 13, 12.7, 25 13, 15.9, 42 3, 11, 14 10, 7.5, 13 3,10,15
G2 1, 6, 6 1, 13, 13 1, 15, 15 10, 15.2, 48 32, 16.4, 52 36, 15.1, 34 6, 12.6, 24 8, 11.1, 34
G3 1, 5, 5 1, 12, 12 2, 10, 15 12, 21.3, 76 18, 13.2, 38 11, 9.4, 15 9, 11.4, 21 6, 10.9, 40
G4 1, 7, 7 1, 16, 16 1, 11, 11 3, 11.3, 22 24, 14.5, 35 5, 18, 31 6, 7.6, 10 8, 9.9, 16
G5 1, 8, 8 2, 12, 14 1, 8, 8 3, 23, 34 10,14.8, 35 4, 19.7, 29 15, 12.5, 66 2, 9.8,14
G6 1, 8, 8 1, 12, 12 9, 16.4, 30 7, 15.5, 33 9, 9.8, 19 16, 14.1, 27 11, 10.1, 22 10, 7.9, 18
G7 1, 6, 6 1, 18, 18 4, 15.5, 20 8, 21.6, 34 21, 14, 40 9, 13.3, 23 5, 9, 23 5, 13.1, 97
G8 1, 6, 6 1, 22, 22 8, 18.2, 28 2, 20, 22 3, 10.6, 20 9, 12.6, 26 10, 12.5, 33 6, 8.3, 15
G9 1, 7, 7 3, 18.3, 31 2, 25, 33 10, 9.7, 15 2, 14.5, 19 19, 10.2, 20 17, 8.2, 20 8, 7.5, 13
G10 1, 4, 4 3, 13.7, 21 7, 22.5, 45 4, 12.3, 27 11, 15.6, 36 6, 16, 29 5, 12.8, 16 5, 10.1, 23
(ave,max) 6.3, 8 22.1, 54 64.1, 158 114.3, 256 193.2, 525 159.8, 544 97.1, 188 58.8, 89
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
k=number of resources
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
t=n
um
be
ro
fit
era
tio
ns
Fig. 4. Average (blue curve) versus maximum (red curve) number of iterations of Algorithm 2 for an instance of n = 10 players and
over 10 uniformly sampled access cost matrices.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered a resource allocation problem under two different settings. We studied
this problem mainly from algorithmic and computational aspects. For the optimal allocation setting we
observed that this problem can be viewed as a generalization of the p-median problem with multiple
types of facilities. We then provided an efficient algorithm to find the optimal allocation for k = 2
resources. For k ≥ 3 we showed that even approximating the optimal solution better than a constant
factor is NP-hard, and provided a simple greedy algorithm which runs in only linear time and delivers a
3-approximate solution of the optimal allocation assuming metric access costs. For the game settings we
established an equivalence between NE points and flip-optimal solutions of the Max-k-Cut problem and
provided some results related to complexity and approximability of the equilibrium points. In particular
we provided two new algorithms for computing NE points using tools from quadratic programming.
As a future direction of research, one can consider generalizing the greedy algorithm to approximate
optimal allocations with heterogeneous request rates. Moreover, it is known that finding a flip-optimal
solution to Max-k-Cut on complete graphs with arbitrary edge-weights is PLS-hard. Generalizing this
result to the case where the edge weights can only belong to {1, . . . , 2m} is another interesting problem.
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